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Abstract 
This paper describes the correlations between intergenerational wealth transfers, or IWTs, 
and income of households in bankruptcy as existing research does not address any 
linkage between the two events. The effect that inheritances, trust payments, and lump 
sum gifts have on personal finances will impact the millions of Americans who will 
receive such transfers during the “Great Wealth Transfer” of the coming decades. I use 
bankruptcy data from the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated Database, or IDB, and 
income data from the University of Michigan’s Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, or 
PSID, to produce a dataset that contains average IWT values of bankrupt households by 
income level per state, per year, from 2008-2016. Through basic ordinary least squares 
analysis, I find that inheritance, trust payment, and lump sum receipt do not consistently 
correlate with income but that the age of the head of the household positively correlates 
with income. I conclude that further research should be conducted in order to create an 
empirical model that predicts one’s probability of declaring bankruptcy after receiving an 
IWT. This research could then be used to inform taxation policy based on the financial 
health outcomes of the recipient.   
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I. Introduction 
 Declaring bankruptcy is rarely a fortunate undertaking. The admission that one 
can no longer fulfill one’s monetary obligations is a tell-tale indication of poor financial 
health. What causes a person to file for bankruptcy is ultimately unique in every case, be 
it habitual overspending, earnings lagging behind living costs, a damaging unplanned 
happening, etc. One such financial event that may impact financial health is the receipt of 
an intergenerational wealth transfer, or IWT. IWTs such as inheritances, trust payments, 
and lump sum gifts can act as a shock to personal wealth and can modify the spending 
and saving habits of a recipient. Since the financial consequences of receiving an IWT 
can be significant, it is important to ask: does the receipt of an IWT negatively impact 
one’s financial health by causing bankruptcy? Most studies on the effects of IWTs tend to 
focus on the changes in wealth or spending habits of recipients, but they do not address 
the question of financial health. 
Now is a critical time to find the answer. In the coming few decades, the United 
States will witness the largest wealth transfer in her history as over $30 trillion will be 
passed down from the baby boomer generation to younger Americans through IWTs 
(Hall, 2019). The receipt of these funds, primarily by millennials, will change the 
financial positions and habits of those set to receive a portion of an increasingly large 
sum of wealth. 
 I describe the correlations between IWTs and the income of households who file 
for bankruptcy. I focus on filings of personal bankruptcy as it represents a clear and 
measurable negative financial outcome. By measuring the correlations between IWTs and 
personal bankruptcy by income level, I describe the characteristics of households who 
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have fallen into a dire financial situation. Revealing these characteristics will place small 
piece in the puzzle of understanding if there is a link between IWTs and bankruptcy. 
 I first review the existing literature on IWTs and personal bankruptcy. I then 
describe the data, methodology, and results before elaborating on the findings in the 
conclusion. Through a basic ordinary least squares analysis, I find that inheritance, trust 
payment, and lump sum receipt do not consistently correlate with income of bankrupt 
households. I also find that the age of the head of the household is positively correlated 
with income of bankrupt households and therefore provides a consistent descriptor of 
these households.  I suggest that the age of the head of the household positive correlation 
with income may be because older heads earn more wages and have more savings and 
investments. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Does the receipt of intergenerational wealth transfers consistently describe the 
income of households in bankruptcy? The existing economic literature regarding IWTs 
and bankruptcy is segregated by subject matter; there is no known research on the direct 
linkage between the two. 
When discussing the causes of personal bankruptcy, it is first important to 
understand the household decision to file for bankruptcy. Like any economic event, filing 
for bankruptcy is primarily a strategic decision based on financial incentives (Fay el. al., 
2002). Households, and therefore individuals, are more likely to declare bankruptcy when 
the cost benefits of doing so increase (Zywicki, 2005).  In other words, people declare 
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bankruptcy primarily as a tactic to save money rather than just as a consequence of an 
inability to pay their obligations due to a shock to income or debt.  
The two most significant factors in an individual’s likelihood of declaring 
bankruptcy are overconsumption, such as using credit to finance debt, and adverse like 
events, which are primarily medical (Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011). But 
overconsumption through credit is the more potent of the two, with high debt to income 
ratios of mortgages and credit cards being twice and four times more likely to lead to 
bankruptcy than an adverse medical event, respectively (Zhu, 2011). This suggests that 
an individual’s chosen spend-save patterns may be the single most important indicator in 
bankruptcy filing. For those prone to overspend through credit card debt financing, low 
principal payments, high interest rates, and revolving debt availability all make credit 
cards prime to be abused (White, 2007). Payday loans are another available credit 
resource which individuals can use to increase their short-term spending. The structure of 
these loans also invites abuse. Payday loans are unsecured, have incredibly high interest 
rates, are small in size with short terms, and are easier to qualify for than more reputable 
sources of credit. Individuals with a desire or need to increase their current spending can 
easily gain access to these loans, and just as easily become trapped in cyclical lending, 
leading to bankruptcy (Skiba and Tobacman, 2019).  
While credit card debt represents the largest portion of filing causes for 
bankruptcy, at 33%, medical debt is present in nearly half of bankruptcies (Himmelstein 
et. al., 2009). Although that figure was measured before the widespread adoption of the 
ACA, medical debt remains the most prominent non-consumption factor in individual 
bankruptcies. They show average medical debt amounts in bankruptcy are higher than 
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average consumption debt, which leads to greater potential savings when a household is 
deciding to declare bankruptcy since medical debt is not as easily discharged as credit 
card debt. A near majority of medical bankruptcies also listed an illness related loss of 
income as a significant contributing factor (Himmelstein et. al., 2009). 
Individuals who declare bankruptcy, even if they are relieved of their previous 
debt, face one last challenge: future borrowing. Declarants, due to the derogatory mark of 
a bankruptcy appearing on their credit reports, typically face higher interest rates, lower 
access to unsecured credit, and higher consumption of sub-prime credit like payday loans 
(Cohen-Cole et. al., 2013). These factors combine to increase a declarant’s financial 
distress post-filing, leading to an increased chance of a future bankruptcy (Han and Li, 
2011).  
Most studies have focused on the purely financial impacts of receiving various 
kinds of IWTs, which treat them as unexpected, positive shocks to wealth due to their 
one-time nature. The choices that recipients of transfers face are whether to save, and 
increase their wealth, spend, and increase their consumption, or smooth their 
consumption via income substitutions. Almost all recipients choose a combination of 
these baskets, so the average increase of net wealth is typically smaller than the absolute 
value of the IWT, sometimes resulting in a net negative impact on wealth if too much 
consumption smoothing via debt occurs (Joulfaian, 2006). Wealthier recipients face an 
increasing chance of reducing their net wealth as the size of the transfer increases due to 
their decreasing marginal utility of net wealth, opting instead to focus more on 
consumption (Joulfaian, 2006). IWTs tend to have a positive effect on the probability of 
retiring in a given time period at any age of the recipient, an effect that linearly scales 
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with the amount of the transfer, even if it was unplanned (Brown et. al., 2010). Many 
recipients also choose not to supplement their consumption or wealth but instead 
supplement their income. Those who choose to replace active income with their IWTs 
may even choose to stop working entirely, creating a negative relationship between 
receipts of IWT and labor force participation (Brown e.t al., 2010). This effect scales with 
the size of an IWT as recipients of larger IWTs decrease earned wages as a portion of 
their total income, choosing instead to rely more heavily upon their inherited assets 
(Holtz-Eakin et. al., 1993). The impact on the participation of labor holds even for older 
recipients and only the recipient is less likely to work. Spouses and other household 
members see no effects (Blau and Goodstein, 2016).  
 Intergenerational wealth transfers can affect more than just an individual’s 
decisions to save, spend, or smooth. IWTs also have knock-on effects that can impact 
generations beyond the initial recipient and non-financial effects. There is a strong 
connection between a recipient’s wealth, their parent’s wealth, and even their 
grandparent’s wealth; though the connection weakens over time (Adermon et. al., 2018). 
This strong intergenerational determinant may imply inherited inequality. “The rich get 
richer” is a popular intuition and is accurate on this issue. But the effects of IWTs on 
wealth inequality are less impactful than other factors such as innate skill, the time 
retirement savings has to grow, and the inclination of people of similar socioeconomic 
backgrounds to marry (Gokhale et. al., 2001). As for non-financial effects, there is a 
small link between a recipient’s inheritance and physical health, though it is likely not 
causal. What is more likely is that parents with enough assets to prepare an IWT also 
have enough financial strength to invest in better healthcare for their children, as no 
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change in physical health follows the receipt of an inheritance (Carman, 2013). These 
links support the possibility that the effects of IWTs may be better explained by a 
person’s background or characteristics rather than the receipt of the IWT itself.  
 
III. Data 
 My aim is to estimate how consistently intergenerational wealth transfers describe 
the income of households in bankruptcy at different income levels and ages. To do so, I 
require data that observes household IWTs such as inheritances, trust payments, and other 
lump sum payments, as well as bankruptcies. However, the input and output data that 
measure IWTs and bankruptcies, respectively, are typically found only in separate sets. I 
therefore draw data from two sources and combine them to assess the relationship 
between IWTs and bankruptcy. I describe each dataset individually before describing 
how I create a combined dataset.  
I use annual bankruptcy data from the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated 
Database (IDB) from 2008-2019, of newly filed case, to measure bankruptcy outcomes. I 
use data from the biennial Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), from 2005-2017, to 
measure inheritance, trust payment, lump sum receipt, and age observations. The 
publication of each PSID is completed in odd-numbered years; however, IWT 
transactions and annual income reports take place in the even-numbered year prior. I also 
use annual income and state of residency observations from both datasets and use these 
variables, along with year, to merge the two datasets. The raw distribution of annual 
incomes for both datasets can be found in Figure 1, which shows the differences in 
income distribution between the two populations. The IDB has a mean annual income 
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nearly $22,000 lower than the PSID and has a distribution more tightly concentrated 
towards lower income earners. 
 The IDB has all new, pending, or concluded bankruptcy cases in the United 
States. I focus only on newly filed cases in each year to avoid counting the same 
bankruptcy filing in multiple years. From 2008-2019, personal bankruptcies swell 
following the economic downturn brought on by the Great Recession. The average 
bankruptcy filer also had a lower income during this swell as the proportion of lower 
income bracket filers increased. These effects are temporary and dissipate by 2015. I 
control for these fluctuations by including fixed year effects in my descriptive model. 
In order to link the data, I group IDB observations by annual income. I use Pew’s 
2014 definitions of household income brackets because that is the most recent year that 
Pew defines five brackets, rather than three, that range from lower income to upper 
income, the distributions of which can be seen in Figure 2. Figure 2 displays the 
aforementioned swell in bankruptcy filings after 2008 as well as the proportional changes 
in the income brackets of those filings. Using five brackets, I provide more detail when 
describing correlations between IWTs and bankruptcy and I more closely match common 
conceptions of income classes by including lower-middle and upper-middle income 
classifications. I generate five binary variables that indicate a filer is in the corresponding 
income bracket. By assigning each observation in the IDB an income bracket, state, and 
year value, I am able to match them with observations from the PSID of the same values. 
I therefore create a dataset with observations that describe a representative average 
household per income bracket, state, and year with IWTs that filed for bankruptcy. I 
explain how I create this dataset after fully describing the IDB and PSID. 
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Summary statistics for the IDBs annual income observations can be found in 
Table 1; for income brackets, Table 2. The mean income of the IDB is slightly under 
$40,000 annually and the lower income bracket comprises the largest group in my 
sample. The standard deviation of IDB annual income is just under $51,000, implying a 
large range of above-mean incomes although few in relative proportion to lower income 
filers. A maximum value of $9,982,968 further confirms the distribution of IDB income, 
where less than 1% of filers have annual incomes over $250,000. The limitation of the 
IDB is that the FJC does not release the age of the filers for legal and privacy reasons. I 
therefore must use the ages contained in my next dataset, the PSID. 
 The PSID surveys nearly 10,000 families to create a nationally representative and 
comprehensive dataset of household finances. In order to form IWT input observations, I 
use the binary and continuous variables for inheritance, trust, and lump sum income per 
household. Income from IWTs is reported separately from normal annual income. I group 
PSID respondents into the same annual income. Summary statistics for the PSID’s 
income and IWT observations can be found in Table 1 while statistics for its income 
brackets can be found in Table 2. Mean income for my PSID sample is $61,825.39 and 
has a standard deviation of just over $90,000. Both of these figures are higher than the 
summary statistics for my IDB sample, indicating that the PSID has a larger proportion of 
higher income earners. Table 2 demonstrates these relative proportions, in which middle 
income is the largest bracket of the PSID and upper-middle and upper income households 
are observed nearly ten times more frequently than the IDB. While the PSID includes the 
ages of the head of the household (a gender-neutral term which the PSID also refers to as 
response person) and their spouse (also referred to as wife in older surveys), I only use 
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the age of the head of household. I do so in order to reduce collinear variables as the ages 
of the heads of household and their spouses have a correlation coefficient of 0.465. 
Furthermore, all households must have a head but not all households have a spouse. I 
include the age of the head of the household because age may affect the likelihood of a 
household’s income bracket and should be controlled for, as demonstrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that age and income bracket are positively correlated for both 
heads of household and spouses, suggesting that households with older inhabitants earn 
more money on average than younger households.  
While the PSID is an impressively thorough dataset, I should address some 
shortcomings of the survey that may impact the correlation between IWTs and 
bankruptcy by income level. The PSID does not seem to capture any high or ultra-high 
net-worth recipients in the study years, as evidenced by there being no IWT exceeding 
one million dollars (the PSID does code for such observations). Another problem is that 
the PSID does not differentiate between trust fund receipts and royalty receipts, nor 
inheritances and large insurance settlements. While the PSID methodology does state that 
observed amounts of royalties and insurance payouts are quite small, hence combining 
them with other financial events, their inclusion introduces possible noise into IWT 
observations that cannot be filtered out. The final shortcoming of the PSID is that it is 
conducted every other year. While current levels of funding and logistical complications 
likely dictate this restraint, it reduces the strength of my conclusions by halving the 
number of possible observations. To try and correct for this, I interpolate odd-numbered 
year observations for my input variables. I use these interpolated observations in my 
combined IDB-PSID dataset. 
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 In order to describe the relationships between intergenerational wealth transfers 
and the income of bankrupt households, I produce a dataset that combines the outcome 
variables of the IDB and input variables of the PSID by matching on unique 
combinations of income bracket, state, and year. However, the relative proportions of 
each income bracket are quite different between the two datasets, as demonstrated in 
Table 2 which displays the results of t-tests between the relative bracket proportions. The 
difference in income bracket proportions in turn creates a large gap between the mean 
incomes of the IDB and PSID since these proportions measure the frequency of 
observations per income range. Performing a regression analysis without adjusting for 
these differences would produce results that have not controlled for this variance and may 
not be accurate given the different weights of income brackets in each dataset. To resolve 
this, I modify the proportions of each income bracket within the PSID dataset through 
random sampling to match the PSID proportions to the proportions of the IDB. This 
modification will also create a PSID sample with a mean income closer to that of the IDB 
sample. 
To combine the IDB and modified PSID datasets, I collapse both datasets into a 
summary of means for each unique combination of state, year, and income bracket. 
Because the PSID only takes place on even years, I then interpolate input observations 
for odd numbered years from 2005-2015. I then merge the two datasets on these unique 
combinations of identification variables. Each observation in this combined dataset 
represents the mean age, annual income, inheritance, trust fund payment, and lump sum 
receipt per income bracket of all bankrupted households in that state-year. 
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With my combined dataset, I describe different models for income based on 
proportional, nominal, and naturally logged input variables. I derive the proportional 
measurements from the collapsed binary indicators of each IWT. Since I collapse the 
binary variables to their mean, they are no longer values of either 0 or 1; instead, they are 
values between 0 and 1 that represent the proportion of “yes” observations in the pre-
collapse data. Therefore, input values for proportional models are either 0 or some 
number less than 1. The means of these proportional values 0.0189 for I, 0.0126 for T, 
and 0.0465 for L. I interpret these means as the values each correlation coefficient is 
multiplied by instead of 1 when input to my descriptive equation. For instance, if β3 were 
50, then I increases the expected income bracket by (50 * .0189) or 0.945. 
 
IV. Methods & Results 
 I use a basic ordinary least squares analysis to describe the correlation between 
intergenerational wealth transfers and bankruptcy by income level. I describe the 
relationship between IWTs and the income of a household in bankruptcy with the 
following equation: 
IBr = β0 + β1AHr + β2Ir + β3Tr + β4Lr + τr + εr 
where IB is income measured as either income bracket or annual ordinary income, AH is 
age of the head of household, I is inheritance, T is trust fund payment, L is lump sum 
receipt, τ stands for fixed year effects, and r stands for a representative average 
household. I, T, and L can each be proportional of bracket, nominal, or natural 
logarithmic measurements. I produce five distinct models that describe the relationship 
between IWTs and the income of households in bankruptcy, the results of which can be 
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found in Table 3. Two models have income bracket as the outcome with proportional and 
nominal IWT inputs and two models use the same types of inputs variables to determine 
annual ordinary income. The final model has the natural logarithm of annual ordinary 
income as the output with the natural logarithm of IWT inputs variables. All five models 
use nominal age input variables.    
 The input variables of my equation predict either the income bracket or the annual 
ordinary income of a representative average household that filed bankruptcy per state-
year. Model 1 shows that income bracket is negatively correlated with proportional 
inheritance, while age of the head of household, proportional trust payment, and 
proportional lump sum receipt are positively correlated. Model 2 shows that income 
bracket is negatively correlated with nominal inheritance and lump sum receipt, while 
age of the head of household and trust payment are positively correlated. Models 3 and 4 
show that annual ordinary income has the same directions of correlation as Model 1 for 
age of the head of household and for when IWTs are measured proportionally and 
nominally, respectively. Model 5 shows that the natural logarithm of annual ordinary 
income is positively correlated with inheritance and age of the head of household, while 
trust payment and lump sum receipt are negatively correlated. 
Comparing across the different models, I can assess which inputs most 
consistently produce the same outcome. A consistent input should produce the same 
direction of correlation for the income bracket and total income models since those 
outputs are positively correlated themselves. Furthermore, a consistent input should 
produce the same direction of correlation across the proportional, nominal, and 
logarithmic models. 
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  I find that all IWT inputs are not consistent descriptors of the income of bankrupt 
households. Inheritance is not a consistent descriptor because it is negatively correlated 
with income when measured proportionally and nominally but positively correlated with 
income with measured by natural logarithm. Trust payment is also not a consistent 
descriptor although it has the opposite correlations with income as inheritance. Lump 
sum receipt is the least consistent descriptor as it positively correlates with income when 
measured proportionally and for annual ordinary income when measured nominally, but 
negatively correlates with income bracket when measured nominally and with the natural 
logarithm of annual ordinary income when by measured by natural logarithm. 
 I find that the age of the head of household is the only input that consistently 
describes the income of bankrupt households because it positively correlates with income 
across all models. Since this input positively correlates with income, I interpret that older 
heads of representative average bankrupt households also have higher incomes. I find that 
while the correlation between age of the head of household and the income of bankrupt 
households is consistently positive, the magnitude of the relationship between these 
variables is not consistent across models. All else being equal, a 50 year-old head of 
household will be three income brackets above 40 year-old head of household. But in 
terms of annual ordinary income, the 50 year-old head household will also have $215,500 
- $246,170 more than the 40 year-old, depending on the model. And when annual 
ordinary income is measured by natural logarithm, a 25% increase in age is associated 
with a roughly 7% increase in annual ordinary income. 
  
V. Discussion & Conclusion 
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 Intergenerational wealth transfers are significant events in our financial lives. 
They have the ability to drastically change the financially situation of an individual or 
household. I focus on personal bankruptcy filings as it represents a clear negative 
outcome for the financial health of households who receive an IWT. By describing the 
correlations between IWTs and the income of a representative average household that 
files for bankruptcy, I find that the age of the head of household is consistently positively 
correlated with income, meaning older heads of bankrupt households have higher 
incomes. Inheritance, trust payment, and lump sum receipt are not consistent descriptors 
of the income of bankrupt households.  
  While I cannot speculate on the microeconomic reasons on the correlations 
between trust payment, lump sum receipt, and age of head of household with expected 
income given the inconclusive results of the models, I can propose reasons why the age 
of the head of household is consistently positively correlated with income. To reiterate, 
the term “head of household” is gender neutral and therefore does not describe income 
trends related to sex or gender identity. Generally speaking, older heads of households 
may have more years of professional experience than their younger peers which might 
result in higher wages for a given job title or job function. Older heads of households 
could also be working in more advanced positions within a given industry or company 
due to promotions. Higher wages would explain the higher annual ordinary income 
expected of older heads of households, as described by the models I interpret in this 
paper. Older heads of households may also have more years of savings or investments to 
draw upon than younger heads, thus increasing their income brackets. This difference in 
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income, and therefore income brackets, would increase exponentially as the age gap 
between heads of households increases linearly given the power of compounding interest.  
 I use terms such as “may” and “might” since the equation and models are purely 
descriptive. To understand the empirical causes of correlations between intergenerational 
wealth transfers and personal bankruptcy, further research must be conducted. Most 
datasets that include variables relating to income rarely include variables that describe the 
cash outflows of respondents. Other datasets that include cash outflows have the opposite 
problem as they rarely include thorough breakdowns of sources of income. I recommend 
that future research into personal and household finances include both income and 
financial outcomes such as bankruptcy in their surveys or studies. I also recommend that 
these surveys occur at least once every other year to best capture annual changes in 
household finances with all variables being measured in each survey. For instance, the 
annual Survey of Consumer Finances contains income figures, outflows, and a question 
about bankruptcy, but does not measure IWTs specifically and only asks respondents if 
they have filed for bankruptcy in the last five years. Future research could also explore 
lagged models that explain correlations between IWTs and the income of bankrupt 
households as a function of time. These intra-year models found that IWTs are not 
consistently correlated with income intra-year, but it is possible that receipt of an IWT in 
one year could impact a household’s annual income for the few years following.  
 As the empirical links between intergenerational wealth transfers and the income 
of households in bankruptcy become better understood, research into this question could 
better inform taxation policy. Taxes on IWTs currently serve as an effort to redistribute 
wealth using the same method as income taxes: the larger the IWT, the higher percentage 
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tax. Such a policy takes more in taxes from wealthier recipients to be spent by 
governments on public goods, effectively redistributing wealth from the top towards the 
bottom. However, the progressive rate tiers and exemptions of the current US tax code on 
IWTs are more influenced by interest groups and numerical convenience than economics 
(Kopczuk, 2013). In order to inform tax policy based on economic welfare, future 
research would have to move beyond descriptive models and into empirical models. 
If further research produces empirical models that predict an IWT recipient’s 
probability of declaring bankruptcy, then the findings could be used to create an IWT tax 
policy based on the welfare of the recipient. For instance, if it is found that increasing a 
recipient’s IWT from $50,000 to $100,000 would decrease their chance of going 
bankrupt by 60%, then exempting IWTs of less than $100,000 would be wise step to 
promote healthy financial incomes. Additionally, if it is found that increasing a 
recipient’s IWT from $5 million to $10 million only decreases their change of going 
bankrupt by 2%, then perhaps taxing IWTs above $5 million at higher rates would raise 
more funds that could be spent on programs and public goods that more efficiently 
promote social welfare.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
VI. Tables & Figures 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of IDB and PSID Datasets 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Annual Income 
(IDB) 
$39,602.65     $50,911.74   $0.12 $9,982,968 
Annual Income 
(PSID) 
$61,825.39     $90,616.99              $1 $630,0000 
Age of Head 41.8             13.5         16   91 
Age of Spouse 24.1   22.9                   0 87 
Inheritance 
(binary) 
.01618    .1262   
Inheritance $1,116.59     $22,519.37               $0 $2,500,000 
Trust Payment 
(binary) 
.009315   .09606   
Trust Payment $168.41    $6,258.39              $0 $900,000 
Lump Sum Receipt 
(binary) 
.03743     .1898                     
Lump Sum Receipt $1,749.24     $28,611.3               $0 $3,000,000 
Note: Based on 11,615,823 IDB observations from 2008-2019, excluding 197 outliers 
with annual incomes over $10,000,000. Including these outliers increases the mean 
income to over $250,000 and standard deviation above $1,000,000 due to three incomes 
of over $10 billion, which may be a clerical error. Also includes 45,733 PSID 
observations from odd-numbered years 2005-2017. Measured before collapsing or 
interpolating. 
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Table 2: Income Bracket T-test Before and After Adjustment 
  Before   After   
Income  
Bracket 
($USD) 
 
IDB 
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
PSID  
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
t-test PSID 
Observations 
PSID  
Mean 
(std. dev.) 
t-test PSID 
Observations 
Lower 
(0 - 31,000) 
 
.4478 
(.4973) 
.3692 
(.4826) 
33.73 16,883 .4477 
(.4973) 
.0108 11,411 
Lower-Middle 
(31,001 – 42,000) 
 
.2106 
(.4077) 
.1174 
(.3219) 
48.84 5,368 .2106 
(.4078) 
.0026 5,368 
Middle 
(42,001 – 126,000) 
 
.3303 
(.4703) 
.4139 
(.4926) 
37.91 18,927 .3303 
(.4703) 
.0048 8,419 
Upper-Middle 
(126,001 – 188,000) 
 
.007204 
(.08457) 
.06492 
(.2464) 
140 2,969 .007219 
(.08466) 
.0294 184 
Upper 
(188,000+) 
 
.004123 
(.06407) 
.03468 
(.183) 
100 1,586 .004119 
(.06405) 
.007 102 
Note: Frequency of IDB observations – 5,201,008 in lower; 2,446,415 in lower middle; 
3,836,835 in middle; 83,678 in upper middle; 47,887 in upper. Represents PSID statistics 
before and after random-sampling modification to match income bracket proportions of 
IDB. 
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Table 3: Correlations between IWTs and Income for Households in Bankruptcy 
Variable (1) 
Income 
Bracket 
(2) 
Income 
Bracket 
(3) 
Annual 
Income 
(4) 
Annual 
Income 
(5) 
Annual 
Income 
Inheritance 
(proportional) 
 
-6.459*** 
(0.525) 
 -1.986e+06*** 
(72,235) 
  
Trust Receipt 
(proportional) 
 
4.129*** 
(0.578) 
 1.260e+06*** 
(95,253) 
  
Lump Sum 
(proportional) 
 
0.784*** 
(0.293) 
 1.251e+06*** 
(32,320) 
  
Inheritance 
(nominal) 
 
 -1.52e-05 
(2.54e-05) 
 
 -29.63*** 
(1.523) 
 
Trust Receipt 
(nominal) 
 
 0.000160*** 
(2.36e-05) 
 50.86*** 
(5.103) 
 
Lump Sum 
(nominal) 
 
 -1.91e-05*** 
(3.19e-06) 
 11.47*** 
(0.303) 
 
Inheritance 
(natural log) 
 
    0.142*** 
(0.0183) 
Trust Receipt 
(natural log) 
 
    -0.161*** 
(0.00802) 
Lump Sum 
(natural log) 
 
    -0.0645*** 
(0.0243) 
Age of Head 
of Household 
 
0.350*** 
(0.00406) 
0.344*** 
(0.00373) 
24,617*** 
(323.9) 
21,550*** 
(285.0) 
0.277*** 
(0.00389) 
Observations 2,886 2,886 2,886 2,886 2,238 
R
2 
 0.803 0.800 0.855 0.851 0.678 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models describe either the income bracket 
or the annual normal income of a representative average household that filed for 
bankruptcy. Model 5 uses the natural logarithm of annual normal income as outcome 
variable. Models include values for a β0 constant and τr fixed year effect but are excluded 
from the table as they do not help describe the correlation between IWTs and income. 
Age variables are reported as nominal values in all models.   
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Figure 1: Distributions of Income in IDB and PSID Datasets 
 
Note: Raw distributions in each dataset. Based on 11,615,823 IDB observations from 
2008-2019, excluding 26,849 outliers with annual incomes over $250,000 and 45,733 
PSID observations from odd-numbered years 2005-2017, excluding 704 outliers with 
annual incomes over $250,000. Vertical reference lines represent means by color-coded 
dataset.  
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Figure 2: Yearly Bankruptcy Cases by Income Bracket 
 
Note: Based on annual IDB data. Displays new bankruptcy filings only. Grouped by Pew 
2014 income bracket definitions.  
 
Figure 3: PSID Correlation of Age and Income Bracket 
 
Note: Based on aggregate of raw PSID data observed from odd-numbered years 2005-
2017.  
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